Middle East Regional Cooperation: A Thirty-Year Assessment
by G. David Miller and Susan Gilson Miller
October 14, 2010
The Price of PeaceThe Camp David Accords signed between Egypt and Israel in 1978 have endured despite a long period of extreme volatility in the region. In 1993, the Oslo Mutual Recognition Pact between Israel and the PLO took a further step toward overall peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors. Over the past three decades, the United States Government has assumed the role of guarantor and active promoter of these agreements visualized as the foundations of peace. In order to assure the smoothness of the process, it designed and managed a multi-faceted program intended to build trust and friendship between peoples on opposite sides of the conflict. The contention of this article is that the fundamental design of certain aspects of that program were flawed and their effects contrary to the goal of bringing the two sides closer together. In fact, we argue that U.S. efforts to bolster peace through programs of economic development called “regional cooperation” actually promoted many of the inequalities and hostilities they were trying to mitigate.
When Israel and Egypt signed the Camp David Peace Accords on March 26, 1979, it was expected that this landmark treaty would lead to an unprecedented “normalization” of relations, the fruits of which would include cultural exchange,trade, exchange of ambassadors, and transfer of technology. A brief overview of the architecture of U.S. assistance shows that the American peace assurance plan came in three parts. First, using some perverse logic, it provided billions of dollars of military assistance to both Israel and Egypt, which, by 2007, amounted to more than 102 billion dollars.[1] Second, two hours after the signing of the peace treaty on March 26, 1979, the United States signed a separate “memorandum of agreement” with Israel that included a pledge that it “will take such remedial measures as it deems appropriate, which may include diplomatic, economic and military measures” in Israel’s defense.[2] And finally, it promised non-military assistance to Israel that by 2007 amounted to more than fifty-three billion dollars, while it committed to Egypt delivery of the largest economic development package in history. By 2007, U.S. non-military aid to Egypt totaled close to forty billion dollars.[3] Each year since 1979, Israel has deposited a check into its national treasury, using a portion to purchase U.S.Treasury notes.[4] For the Egyptians, much of their economic development package was used to purchase Western science and technology in the form of American training, technical assistance and American-made goods and services.[5]A very small part of this massive aid, hardly noticeable among all of the hundreds of American projects being launched by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in Egypt, was a tiny program funded annually at a level of five to seven million dollars. Its purpose was to encourage cooperation between high-level Israeli scientists working at scores of well-funded Israeli research institutions, on the one hand, and a handful of top Egyptian research scientists struggling with very limited resources on the other. This program, known as MERC (Middle East Regional Cooperation), is the subject of our inquiry.
The assumption made by the technocrats who crafted the peace package was that the Israelis possessed a technological and scientific research capacity that their Arab neighbors were lacking. It was believed that the sharing of this knowledge would be an important contribution to the “normalization” process. Moreover, the cooperation at the scientific level would be accompanied by friendly exchanges that would open closed borders and allow Israelis and Egyptians to travel back and forth with ease. In retrospect, we see major flaws in this modest, good-faith, rapport-building initiative that led to unanticipated and disappointing consequences. The American effort to expose a small cadre of Arab academic elites to better-endowed Israeli scientific institutions was fated to achieve little in the way of trust and cooperation. Instead it accentuated a perception of technological inequality, threatened to alienate Arab academics from their own societies, and increased regional anxieties regarding Western cultural and economic hegemony.
A Windfall of Benefits
Although the end of active hostilities was welcomed on all sides, there was recognition from the beginning that the dividends of peace would be different for each of the signatories. For the United States, who signed the treaty as witness and guarantor, it was the fulfillment of a Cold War strategy aimed at moving Egypt into the Western camp and reducing the influence of the Soviet Union in the region. For Israel, it removed a potential adversary from the Arab-Israel conflict. And for Egypt, it not only alleviated fear of more wasted lives, but it also opened the door to the promise of greater economic progress.[6] This was an era when a devout belief in technology as the gateway to development predominated; in the eyes of Egyptian academics and politicians, the United States and Israel were the keepers of the keys.
In exchange for a complete cessation of hostilities and for Israel’s return of the Sinai Peninsula, the United States began its annual contribution by providing a total of $7.3 billion to be shared by Israel and Egypt at a ratio of 3 to 2, respectively. This included a mix of military and economic assistance. To date, this ratio continues with only minor changes.[7] USAID – the preferred vehicle of American diplomacy for ‘winning hearts and minds’ for peace and democracy in Central America and Vietnam – was automatically chosen to oversee the delivery of the peace dividend. From 1979 onward, USAID assumed responsibility for making an annual electronic transfer of $800 million of non-military aid into the Israeli treasury. And, for Egypt, it oversaw the delivery of technical assistance and economic development projects at a cost of over $1 billion a year. (Military assistance was overseen separately by the USDepartment of Defense).
From its foundation in 1945, the Arab League established over twenty specialized agencies addressing development issues. At a meeting in Baghdad in November 1978, leaders of twenty Arab states and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) agreed that if Egypt signed the Accords, its membership in the Arab League would be suspended.[8] Once the treaty was signed, Arab nations broke off diplomatic relations with Egypt, terminating all economic aid to Cairo.[9] Although there was communication and consultation among Arab science, technology, and development personnel under Arab League auspices before 1978, there were few regional development projects. Sadat decided that the benefits to Egypt of remaining in the Arab League were less than what he could gain from United States’ foreign assistance. Consequently, USAID moved into Cairo, with over one thousand employees and consultants to bring development assistance to Egypt. [10]
A Vision of Progress through Science
Already in November 1978, a hastily-designed study by the USAID Office of Science and Technology was launched in anticipation of a comprehensive peace.[11] At the time, all R&D activity for USAID fell under the purview of the Office of Science and Technology. Two members of the Graduate Program in Science, Technology and Public Policy at George Washington University were commissioned to interview academics and government officials in Egypt, Israel and Jordan in order to recommend ways of promoting the participation of frontline states (Israel, Syria, Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon as well as the PLO) in cooperative ventures. Not surprisingly, given its provenance, the focus of the study was upon projects that would advance scientific and technological solutions to development problems in the region.
The U.S. Congress picked up the theme of cooperation and sealed the deal made at Camp David by passing the 1979 Foreign Assistance Bill. The sentiment of Congress was expressed as follows:
The Congress declares and finds that the United States can and should play a constructive role in securing a just and durable peace in the Middle East by facilitating increased understanding between the Arab countries and Israel and by assisting the countries on [sic] the region in their efforts to achieve economic progress and political stability, which are the essential foundations of peace. It is the sense of the Congress that the United States assistance programs in the Middle East should be designed to promote mutual respect and security among the countries in the region and to foster a climate conducive to increased economic development, thereby contributing to a community of free, secure, and prospering countries in the Middle East.[12]
Strong opposition in the Middle East to the treaty caused considerable worry among its supporters about its long-term durability. Despite the stated purpose of the Foreign Assistance Act to “promote mutual respect and security,” the distinctively different funding mechanisms to Israel and Egypt did little to advance this objective. Moreover, there were no mechanisms built into the Accords that would actually operationalize cooperation. These obstacles had to be overcome before the “peace dividend” could be realized.
Enter Congressman Waxman
At the time of the framing of the 1979 Foreign Assistance Bill, Representative Henry Waxman of California served on the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East. Rep. Waxman had a strong interest in Israel and was eager to do whatever was needed to assure the success of the treaty. Looking back, he recently remarked, “I wanted the U.S. to help break down psychological barriers between Egyptians and Israelis so they could form personal relationships and bolster the peace process.”[13] Mr. Waxman therefore added an amendment to the 1979 Foreign Assistance Bill that set aside $5 million for activities to promote Arab-Israeli cooperation. In the belief that science and technology would be beneficial, the amendment read as follows:
It is the sense of the Congress that, in order to continue to build the structure of peace in the Middle East, the United States should finance and where appropriate participate in, cooperative projects of a scientific and technological nature involving Israel and Egypt and other Middle East countries wishing to participate. These cooperative projects should include projects in the fields of agriculture, health, energy, the environment, education, water resources, and the social sciences.[14]
Rep. Waxman recently explained: “I believed such work could help develop professional relationships and friendships that could enhance peace and understanding regardless of political developments… I felt that scientists were in a unique position to set aside political and ideological views while pursuing research to benefit the entire region. The academic arena was deliberately the focus of the program to reduce any government involvement that could inject political interference.” Mainly due to his efforts, the Middle East Regional Cooperation (MERC) was launched in 1979 and has been funded annually ever since at the level of five to seven million dollars. For the next quarter of a century, almost without exception, the MERC program involved three participants: Israel, Egypt and the United States. During that period, MERC’s projects have almost exclusively been in the hard sciences with only marginal inclusion of social science or educational activity.
The Project Agenda
In the beginning, the projects were opportunities for the Egyptians to address applied technological issues, demonstrated by a list of the first projects funded by MERC: arid lands agriculture, adapting marine technology to solve the erosion problems caused by the Aswan damn, studying common vector-borne diseases such as Rift Valley Fever (a kind of malaria) that shortened life expectancy in Egypt to 51 years (as opposed to 71 in Israel), and creating fish pond projects and goat breeding projects similar to those underway in Israel. But there was an imbalance built-in right from the beginning. Egyptians looked at each project as a means of improving Egyptian scientific and technological capacity, while Israeli and American scientists were eager to expand their research into unchartered areas that offered opportunities for publication. In Israel and Egypt, the major actors were academic institutions having close links to the appropriate line agencies such as the Ministries of Agriculture or Health; on the American side, it was an even mix of academic institutions, government agencies and NGOs. Many of the early projects were large, requiring multi-year funding that quickly used up the annual appropriation of $5 million.
Limiting Contact
At the same time as the George Washington University study, USAID carried out a second study using in-house staff to examine whether social science research should be added to the project menu.[15] It concluded that the socio-political implications of carrying out social research were sensitive and should be studied carefully by a joint commission made up of representatives of the principal signatories. However, no such commission was ever formed. In the first fifteen years of MERC, only one major social science project was launched. “Images in Conflict,” undertaken ten years before Oslo, included Palestinian social scientists along with their Egyptian and Israeli counterparts. This collaborative and comparative research assessed viewpoints of the “other” by surveying more than 2,000 participants in Palestine, Egypt, and Israel in focused group discussions. In an anticipated second phase, researchers from each of the three communities would come together to analyze the findings and make them public. However, there was little support within USAID to continue to fund this project after the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980. Rather, strong sentiment held that the water, health and agriculture projects should take precedence over social science in the competition for limited funding. So the second phase was never funded and the “Images in Conflict” project was closed down. [16]
Only a tiny fraction of MERC funding went to projects that could be labeled as not strictly science and technology. According to the Congressional Research Office, MERC provided a small grant to the Israel Palestine Center for Research and Information in 2003 to draft a series of policy papers on Palestinian textbook reform.[17] And it provided some supplemental funding for a Mediterranean youth conference held in Spain in 1985 in which there were participants from all over the Mediterranean from Spain to Turkey and included youth from Israel, Egypt, Lebanon and Palestine.[18] Together the sum total of MERC funding for these projects came to less than $1.5 million, about .01% of all MERC funding. But these projects were the exception that proved the rule. An overview of all MERC projects funded in its first twenty years shows a very limited record of people-to-people exchanges. The final report of a seven-year-long project to combat infectious diseases offers insight into the typical level of interaction among the participants. As the final report indicates, scientific activities were conducted “largely independently from one another, with very little evidence of true interdependent collaboration among the different research groups…. Cooperation among the Egyptian and Israeli participants was largely confined to joint attendance at meetings and limited exchange of samples.”[19]
Furthermore, there was practically no public knowledge of these collaborative activities, with little media attention and none of the usual public ceremonies marking inception or completion. A “Wastewater Re-use Project” that grew out of an earlier “Marine Technology Project” reported results that were somewhat more upbeat. After almost twenty-five years of implementation involving many of the same Israeli and Egyptian actors, the final report describes the relationship among its core members thusly: “This group consists of approximately ten Israelis and Egyptians who periodically visit each other’s countries, remain in contact by telephone and fax, and meet at professional meetings and conferences.”[20]
Beyond Egypt and Israel
In May 1993, after Oslo I, Israel and the PLO signed a mutual recognition pact; in October1994, Israel and Jordan signed a peace accord. As a result, the MERC program greatly changed. Almost immediately, research institutes in Israel and Jordan began studying two common concerns, the Dead Sea and the Red Sea. Two years into their joint effort, they partnered with the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute by using MERC funding. The project with Woods Hole demonstrated a new pattern of cooperation using MERC funds.
In this new era, MERC was never the carrot; nor were the American institutions the catalyst for initiating collaboration between Israel and its neighbors. Rather, after 1994, MERC funding became just one more well to draw from when seeking support for collaborative projects. Over $7 billion was disbursed between 1994 and 2004 from a variety of international sources for reconstruction and rehabilitation projects in Palestine alone.[21] Over that same period, approximately $60 million of MERC money — slightly less than 1% of the whole — was used to support cooperation activities between Israel and the entire the Arab world including Palestine.
Nevertheless, MERC funding continued to play an active role in cross-border scientific activities and the program took on renewed vigor after 1994, as scientists in institutions in Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco and Tunisia joined their counterparts in Israel and Egypt in preparing proposals for MERC funding. Among these multi-lateral initiatives is the project “Basic and Applied Research in Tropical Diseases of the Middle East.”[22] Scientists from Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine and Tunisia benefited from the research protocol and the data collected from the earlier epidemiology project initiated by Israeli, Egyptian and American researchers in the first year of MERC funding in 1979. As the program evolved into multi-lateral participation, the modalities of cooperation also changed. Several USAID project reports suggested that the Arab partners felt more comfortable coming to the larger meetings where the relative size of the Israeli presence was diminished.
The case of cooperation between Israel and Morocco in the agricultural sphere stands out as an exception. The science produced was far more equilateral and comprehensive than the earlier Israeli-Egyptian exchanges, with both sides receiving important benefits. Israel acquired new products such as argon trees and truffles, while Morocco got new varieties of tomatoes and asparagus. News about the cooperation appeared in the Moroccan press with photos of leaders from both countries shaking hands and congratulating one another over their success. The hypothetical explanation of this difference between Morocco and other Arab states is that Morocco still has a small but important Jewish population, unlike other countries of the Middle East and North Africa, where age-old Jewish communities have disappeared. Israel, of course, has a large and important community originally from Morocco. The two countries have a long history of mutual engagement. Indeed, Morocco under former King Hassan II was an important agent of the peace process leading up to and following the Camp David Accords. Because of these pre-existing ties, both sides were eager to reconnect. USAID benefited by demonstrating an outstanding MERC success, while Israeli and Moroccan scientists were able to tap into MERC funds and move their initiatives forward.[23]
Oslo created a new set of problems for MERC. Cooperation between Israel, on the one hand and Egypt or Jordan on the other is different from cooperation between Israel and the Palestinians. Egypt and Jordan are separated from Israel by clear and undisputed borders; the two sides are able to maintain the polite and distant relationship of frosty neighbors. Academics could meet at conferences, share research protocols, carry on parallel studies and exchange occasional letters and even phone calls. They could do this without drawing attention to themselves, and often without even meeting, while benefitting from generous support funds managed by a third-party US institution.
After Oslo, Israelis and Palestinians were able to enter into similar joint projects, but without the same degree of separation. Israelis and Palestinians are not just in the same neighborhood; they claim the same floor space in a shared condominium. Scores of proposals for MERC-funded projects involving Israelis and Palestinians immediately materialized, but without the standard US referee.[24] These proposals were aimed at specific goals, best described as a long overdue effort to clean up decades of the detritus of what Johann Galtung has called “structural violence, the social and environmental destruction that people are almost inured to because it becomes routine.”[25] A good example is a cluster of projects concerning the ecological blight caused by the olive industry. One project tried to reduce the environmental impact of olive mill wastewater;[26] another created an olive mill composting system,[27] and a third controlled the spread of the olive fly (bactrocera oleae).[28] The Palestinian participants included a mix of Palestinian NGOs, the Palestinian Authority, and Hebron University. They were joined by the Israeli Technion and the Royal Scientific Society of Jordan, along with other Israeli research institutes. One major result of Oslo was the realization that Israelis and Palestinians could join forces against a common enemy: blight and pollution within their shared condominium. This cooperation strategy was conceived in the spirit of the Middle Eastern adage: “The enemy of my enemy is my friend.“
Putting MERC in Context: The “Drug Addiction Research Project”
The role that MERC has played in fostering regional cooperation must be placed in perspective. Measuring the impact of MERC projects within a changing physical and social landscape depends upon the lens that is used. Placed in the shadow of the billions of dollars of aid from other sources, MERC projects totaling just under $7 million per year are barely noticeable. Despite its relatively diminutive size, was the MERC program able to achieve some of the high-minded objectives bestowed on it by its initiators? Has MERC made a difference? Did MERC, for example, meet the goal of advancing “normalization?”
A 1998 USAID study of MERC offers a stark picture of the how the program was faring a few years after Oslo.[29] According to the report:
[T]he overall effect of scientific cooperation on peace building tends to be limited…. [O]nly relatively few scientists are apt to be involved in collaborative pursuits, even under the best of circumstances. Despite expenditures exceeding $100 million during the past two decades, the number of Israeli and Egyptian scientists who came into contact with each other has been small, not more than one hundred.[30]
On the other hand, a few scattered successes point in a more positive direction. The post-Oslo “Drug Addiction Research Project” was the first important MERC-funded social science project since the aborted “Images” project. A closer look at this initiative allows us to observe how Israelis and Palestinians came together to study a shared social problem. During some of the most trying moments in recent Israeli-Palestinian relations, Richard Isralowitz, professor in the Department of Social Work at Ben Gurion University, and Mohamed Al-Afifi, a physician in Gaza, Palestine, persisted in a program of cooperation. The issue that brought them together was a shared concern over the increasing levels of drug abuse in both their communities. Immediately after Oslo, when a brief window made it politically feasible for Israelis and Palestinians to cooperate, these two scientists joined with General Mahmoud Al-Zuhairi of the National Police of the Palestinian Authority to discuss their mutual drug problem. Drs. Isralowitz and Afifi managed to invite over fifty Israelis and Palestinians –police, social workers, and medical personnel — to a meeting in Ramallah. They also invited an American scholar, Dr. Richard Rawson, a noted authority on drug abuse, to help steer the discussion. In a recent phone interview,[31] Dr. Rawson related the story of this first meeting and how it eventually led to the unfolding of the largest social science program ever funded by MERC.
“At that first meeting,” he said, “there were a lot of accusations passing back and forth. The Israelis blamed the Palestinians for smuggling the drugs. The Palestinians blamed the Israelis for creating both the climate and the market for drug use. There was a lot of tension in the room.” Eventually they were able to find common ground. They agreed that the bottom line was that drugs threatened both communities, and they decided to launch a study to learn the extent and nature of the problem. Dr. Rawson, back in his office at UCLA in 2000, surfed the web and found the MERC program. With his colleagues, he submitted a proposal for a project entitled: “A Substance Abuse Monitoring System for Israeli and Palestinian Communities.”[32] Not long after the beginning of the project, the Second Intifada began. “It became increasingly impossible for the teams of researchers to meet,” Rawson told us. They had to carry on their work separately and remain in touch via email and phone. When they did convene once or twice a year it was on “neutral” ground in places such as Sharm el Sheikh. Dr. Afifi became progressively isolated in Gaza. Nevertheless he persevered, realizing that his commitment kept everyone else going.
Before joining this project, Rawson had only a passing interest in the Middle East. After becoming a participant, he traveled to Israel, Jordan, Palestine and Egypt for the first time. He started to read about drug abuse in Arab countries and learned it was a growing problem throughout the region. He believed that if the project could be expanded to include Egypt, Lebanon and Jordan, it might ease Dr. Afifi’s isolation. He applied for and received a MERC grant that included this wider circle of researchers. However, the logistics involved in bringing these people together became nightmarish. On one occasion the group met in California; three times they met in Istanbul. Nevertheless, according to Rawson, drug-abuse specialists from over twenty countries attended, including Saudi Arabia and Iran. Everyone was extremely cordial, he reported, the Israelis were well received. Following a meeting in Egypt at an especially tense moment in the conflict, Dr. Afifi was prevented for several weeks by Israeli officials from returning to Gaza. Moreover, the Egyptian doctors were pressured to cease their participation by the medical professional organization as well as by radical political groups. The mix of studying a controversial social problem and sharing results with Israelis was a volatile one.
An additional irritant came from an unexpected source. As the project unfolded, according to Rawson, the project leaders received conflicting messages from USAID. On one hand, he was continually criticized for holding meetings in third-party countries; on the other, he was rebuked for not moving the project forward fast enough. Rawson said that no one in Washington or in the USAID mission in Tel Aviv showed any understanding of what was happening “outside of their bubble.” They never attended meetings or observed the actual work in the field. When asked if there was any opportunity for him to share experiences with other participants in other MERC projects, Rawson was bemused by the question. He had no idea who others were, or what were their experiences might be in bringing about cooperation.[33]
Peace and De-development
The overriding question remains: Why was regional cooperation placed under the responsibility of an agency for development? Why were science and technology chosen to be the medium through which long-term enemies were expected to find common cause and seek out mutual understanding? And why, of all the nearly forty projects, does drug abuse study stand out as one of the very few initiatives reaching to the roots of society and offering opportunities for people-to-people exchanges among researchers, youth, and community leaders?
In 1978, when the George Washington University researchers were assigned the task of identifying modalities for post-conflict cooperation for the Middle East region, their 57-page report begins with a warning:
The difference looms large in considering the development of cooperative S[cientific] & T[echnological] relations between Israel and its neighbors…. Israel is essentially a western state, in orientation and philosophy. Egypt and Jordan are Middle East Arab States…. Israeli universities such as Hebrew University, the Weizman Institute and Technion are of world stature in science and technology; nothing comparable is to be found in Egypt or Jordan…. Israelis economically, technologically and culturally (by Western standards) [are] considerably more advanced than Egypt or Jordan. Except in isolated fields the participants will not be on an equal footing when cooperation is initiated.[34]
In fact, the very meaning of what “cooperation” meant when it came to science and technology was brought into question from the outset. The GW report noted that “in a discussion with an Israeli government official who inquired as to what the United States meant by ‘cooperation’, it was agreed that the concept of ‘reciprocal relations’ would serve well.”[35] Encouraging Israel to take the lead in delivering science and technology to its Arab neighbors was fraught with the danger of provoking the accusation that Israel was acting as a surrogate for Western colonial power. Environmentalist Claude Alvares, in a critique of the use of science as an instrument of Western colonialism, gives voice to an accusation that both Israelis and Egyptians were hoping to avoid: “…western science, an associate of colonial power, would function not any less brazenly and effectively: extending its hegemony by intimidation, propaganda, catechism and political force.”[36] Science can become toxic if it is inserted as a touchstone between two groups facing each other across a chasm of social and psychological differences. Supporting elites engaged in scientific and technological endeavors that are framed by massive development projects launched in the name of an ambiguous notion of peace — this could be a recipe for disaster.
Cong. Waxman Takes the Long View
U.S. economic and military aid to Israel and Egypt remain an important platform for fulfilling the vision of the Camp David Accords, even today. But the reality is that relations between the Egyptian and Israeli people are still inhibited by a “cold peace.” Congressman Waxman says he believes that the MERC program continues to offer a much-needed forum for demonstrating the promise of Israeli-Palestinian peace. He goes on to say that he remains “hopeful that activities supported by the new people-to-people exchange program and the evolution of technology will create more informal opportunities for dialogue and understanding outside the governmental sphere…. I consider MERC one of my most creative legislative accomplishments.”[37] Mr. Waxman’s phrase “People to People” echoes the language of the 1995 Interim Agreement between Israel and the Palestinian Authority: “the two sides shall cooperate in enhancing the dialogue and relations between their peoples”.[38] Although the “people-to-people” language persists, there is still no doubt that the science and technology aspect remains paramount. MERC projects may include components such as joint Arab-Israeli educational activities or extension training, but these components are subsidiary and complementary to the technical activities of the research project.[39]
A few cross-border social programs have survived over the past decade of conflict, but none are funded by MERC program. They operate on limited budgets, funded by individuals, private foundations, international organizations and other US government bureaus. These programs have managed to keep the spirit of Oslo alive by supporting people-to-people exchanges — Seeds of Peace, Agents of Change, People to People International, Givat Haviva, and JADE, to name a few.[40] Although these programs engage youth from throughout the Middle East in workshops and other joint projects, when they have applied for MERC funding, they have been referred to other government programs.
In sum, MERC has been swallowed up by the multi-billion dollar USAID development assistance extravaganza. It is nearly impossible to discern the borders between the massive American aid program and the modest fund meant to encourage people-to-people cooperation. Moreover, there is little evidence that science and technology will succeed more than any other approach in winning the hearts and minds of the people on either side. We have little evidence that America’s effort to support cooperation has warmed to the “Cold Peace” between Israel and Egypt. In fact, it may have had the opposite effect of adding fuel to the fire of opposition, anger and resentment across the region. A nagging question arises from the mercurial record of thirty years of US intervention: Can MERC’s message of cooperation and understanding prevail, so long as it is part of an official US development program widely regarded as yet another instrument in America’s search for economic and military hegemony?
Notes
[1] Annual Development Coordination Committee Report to Congress, U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants, Annex 1: Obligations and Loan Authorizations, July 1 1945 – September 30, 2007. This and all other unpublished documents cited in this paper are found in the USAID onlime archives at http://dec.usaid.gov/ (Hereafter, USAID/DEXS)
[2] Congress and the Nation, Vol. V (1981): 106.
[3] USAID/DEXS. The Greenbook, U.S. Agency for International Development, U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants, Obligations and Loan Authorizations, 2007, http://qesdb.usaid.gov/gbk/index.html
[4] Clyde R. Mark, Israel: U.S. Foreign Assistance, Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade Division, April 26, 2005, p.8
[5] Jeremy M. Sharp, U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East: Historical Background, Recent Trends, and the FY 2007 Request, Congressional Research Service, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, March 24, 2006.
[6] William J. Burns, Economic Aid and American Policy Toward Egypt 1955-1981 (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1985), p.190.
[7] “Special International Security Assistance Act of 1979” (P.L. 96-35) Congressional Research Service.
[8] Ibid, p. 107
[9] Adel Safty, From Camp David to the Gulf (Montreal, New York: Black Rose Books, 1992, p. 104.
[10] USAID/EGYPT history, http://egypt.usaid.gov/Default.aspx?pageid=6
[11] USAID/DEXS. Herman Pollack and Sally Ann Baynard, Near East Cooperation in Science and Technology, The Graduate Program in Science, Technology and Public Policy at George Washington University, Nov. 1978
[12] Public Law 95-384 September 26, 1978 (92 STAT.734)
[13] Henry Waxman, E-mail to the authors of this paper, April 28. 2009
[14] Public Law 95-384 sec (5) Sept. 26, 1978
[15] USAID/DEX. Raga S. Elim and Louis Cantori, A Study of Regional Cooperation in the Social Sciences in the Near East, November 17, 1978.
[16] USAID/DEX. Gerald David Miller, Images In Conflict –Project 298-018 , Amendment – Issues Paper, Near East Advisory Committee, USAID, United States Government Memorandum, May 25, 1982.
[17] USAID/DEX. Aaron D. Pina, Palestinian Education and the Debate Over Textbooks, CRA Report for Congress, April 27, 2005 p. 9
[18] USAID/DEX .Kenneth Cushman and Ira Kaufman, Near East Regional Cooperation Project: Mediterranean Youth Environment Training Program in Virginia, Egypt, Israel and Spain, 1985, Evaluation Report.
[19] USAID/DEX. Final Evaluation Report, 1996, Middle East Regional Infectious Diseases Project.
[20] USAID/DEX. Final Evaluation Report, 1993, Technological and Environmental Health Aspects of Waste Water for Irrigation Project.
[21] USAID/DEX. Anne Le More, International Assistance to the Palestinians After Oslo; Political Guilt, Wasted Money (London: Routledge, 2008),p. 179.
[22] USAID/DEX. United States Agency for International Development – National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, Basic and Applied Research in Tropical Diseases of the Middle East, Final Evaluation, June 1996.
[23] USAID/DEX. Moroccan Cooperative Agricultural Research Program, Project Final Report, January 1998.
[24] USAID Development Experience Clearinghouse, Bur. For Near East. Middle East Regional Cooperation Program, http://dec.usaid.gov
[25] Johan Galtung, “Cultural Violence,” Journal of Peace Research, 27, no. 3 (1990) : 291-305
[26] USAID/DEX. Sobhi Basheer, et al, Reducing the Environmental Impact of Olive Mill Wastewater in the Middle East, Semi-Annual Report No. 1, January 26, 2002.
[27] USAID/DEX. Isam Sabbah, et al, Recycling of Olive Mill Waste by Combining a Composting System Beside a Wastewater Treatment Scheme, Semi-Annual Progress Report No 4. June 30, 2004.
[28] USAID/DEX. Mustafa Natour, et al, A Regional Strategy for Control of bactrocera oleae- the Olive Fly, Semi-Annual Progress Report No. 1, November 30, 2007.
[29] USAID/DEX. Krishna Kumar, Scientific Cooperation and Peace Building: A Case Study of USAID’s Middle East Regional Cooperation Program, USAID Evaluation Special Study Report No. 77, 1998
[30] Ibid., p.31
[31] Dr. R. Rawson, telephone interview, May 8, 2009
[32] USAID/DEX. Richard Rawson, A Substance Abuse Monitoring System for Israeli and Palestinian Communities, Semi-Annual Report, USAID, June 2004.
[33] Dr. Rawson added a personal note at the end of our interview. In December 2008, as the war in Gaza raged, Dr. Afifi worked in the Gaza hospital emergency room; during one particularly heavy Israeli bombing raid, much of his house was destroyed. The son of Dr. Isralowitz, his Israeli counterpart, was doing his military service in Gaza, while Dr. Afifi’s daughter was moving severely wounded from Gaza to a hospital in Tel Aviv. The two sought each other out in the midst of the fighting and shared a moment of quiet conversation.
[34] Pollack and Baynard, Near East Cooperation in Science and Technology, p. 6.
[35] Ibid., p. 2.
[36] Clause Alvares, “Science “in The Development Dictionary, Wolfgang Sachs ed. (London: Zed Books, Ltd., 1997), p. 220.
[37] Henry Waxman. E-mail communication to the author, April 28, 2009.
[38] USAID/DEX. The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. September 28, 1995. Annex VI, Article VIII, Paragraph 1.
[39] USAID DEX. Guidelines for MERC pre-proposals for December 15, 2008.
[40] For a list of groups promoting cooperation and dialogue see: http://www.mideastweb.org/dialogdir.htm
